In my commentary, I will argue that the conclusions drawn in the paper Noncommutative causality in algebraic quantum field theory 1 by Gábor Hofer-Szabó are incorrect. As proven by J.S. Bell, a local common causal explanation of correlations violating the Bell inequality is impossible.
confined to the "classical" domain or the quantum domain or a relativistic or non-relativistic domain, it is a meta-theoretical claim, excluding (almost) all possibilities of a local explanation for the statistical correlations observed in EPR-type experiments. 2 Admittedly, a statement about nature can never reach the same degree of rigor as a theorem of pure mathematics for there is always an issue of connecting formal concepts to "real-world" concepts. Bell, however, was one of the clearest thinkers of the 20th century and his analysis, unobscured by the misunderstandings of some of his later commentators, is perfectly precise and conclusive in this respect. 3 It is against this background that contributions to the subject have to be evaluated.
The paper Noncommutative causality in algebraic quantum field theory by Gábor HoferSzabó, that I was gratefully given the opportunity to comment on, seems to be an offspring of a research project started about one and a half decades ago by Miklos Rédei (Rédei 1997) and concerned with the question whether in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory 4 correlations between space-like separated events (in particular such violating the Bell inequality) have local explanations in terms of "common causes". You see, what worries me about this research program is that it seems to suggest that the status of Bell's theorem is not yet clear, that the issue of non-locality is not yet settled, because somehow the technical details of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory could turn out to matter, and type III von-Neumann algebras could turn out to matter, and noncommutativity could turn out to matter. But that would be incorrect; none of this really matters.
Contrary to what I've just so emphatically stated, Mr. Hofer-Szabó makes quite an astonishing announcement. He claims that by committing ourselves to the framework of AQFT and by "embracing noncommuting common causes" we can achieve what Bell's theorem would seem to exclude, namely to provide a "local (joint common causal) explanation for a set of correlations violating the Bell inequalities". Although such a statement will certainly make a huge impression on people who believe that noncommutativity holds the one great mystery of quantum physics, we should pause for an instant to assess its plausibility.
Physical events, or "causes" and "effects", whatever we might mean by that, are certainly not the kind of thing that can either commute or not commute. Operators, I grant, can commute or not commute, and so can perhaps elements of lattices with respect to certain set-theoretic operations. Bell's theorem, however, doesn't care about any of this. Bell's argument is solely concerned with the predictions that a candidate theory makes for the probabilities (relative frequencies) of certain physical events, not with the mathematical structure that it posits to make those predictions or represent those events. So how could it be possible to avoid the consequences of Bell's theorem by denying "commutativity", which hasn't been among its premises in the first place?
Let me try to explain what I think the result presented in the paper of Hofer-Szabó actually consists in and why I think it's completely missing the point as concerning the issue of local causality. Contrary to what is being suggested in the paper, the existence of a "commuting/noncommuting (weak/strong) (joint) common cause system" according to its definitions 2 and 3 is not sufficient for a local (common causal) explanation of correlations between space-like separated events. Such an explanation would at least be required to reproduce the statistical correlations that it was set out to explain. The kind of "explanation" that the author provides doesn't do this.
As his paper correctly states, the statistics for the events A i , B i are different whether the state is first projected on the possible "common causes" (since that's what happens when we compute φ • E c ) or not. Most notably, the probabilities for the correlated events after the "occurrence" (more correctly: measurement) of "noncommuting common causes" (the righthand-side of eq. (1) below) satisfy the Bell inequality -in accordance with Bell's theoremwhereas the statistical correlations that the author claims to explain violate Bell's inequality. Note that in the case where A i , B j don't commute with C k we will generally find that
This is, I assume, a familiar fact (if you find the notation confusing, write
, and so on). In particular, there is nothing deep or mysterious or metaphysically interesting about it, if only we appreciate the fact that the right-hand-side of (1) does not describe the same physical situation in which the system remains undisturbed in the common past of A and B, but that the projection on the common cause system (indeed one could think of a measurement of an observable C with spectral decomposition {C k }) affects (decoheres) the quantum state in a way that can influence subsequent (measurement-)events. In our case, it will simply destroy the EPR-correlations, so that violations if the Bell inequality don't occur at all. In particular, the correlations described by the left-hand-side of (1) are not explained by the right-hand-side of (1) since the two probability distributions are different. In (Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés 2012), the authors explicitly acknowledge this point, yet respond by saying that "the definition of the common cause does not contain the requirement (which our classically informed intuition would dictate) that the conditional probabilities, when added up, should give back the unconditional probabilities [...] or, in other words, that the probability of the correlating events should be built up from a finer description of the situation provided by the common cause." (p.20) 5
Although this doesn't strike me as a particularly strong argument, it may be a good starting point for adding a few remarks and highlighting some of the disagreements between the Hofer-Szabó and myself.
1. As I see it, the problem here is not with probability theory ("that the conditional probabilities, when added up, should give back the unconditional probabilities"), but rather with the assumption that the "common cause system" provides a "finer description" of the same physical situation. The fact that C + C ⊥ = 1 in terms of operators does not imply that it makes no physical difference whether any of the "events" occur, or none. There is a difference between a physical situation in which a photon can either pass or not pass a polarization filter and a physical situation with no polarization filter at all.
2. Even if we accepted the premise of the answer, it would not resolve the issue. The interesting question concerning correlations between space-like separated events is whether they can be explained by some sort of local "mechanism" (I'm using "mechanism" broadly here). Bell's theorem states that this is impossible if the Bell inequality is violated. The fact that Hofer-Szabó presents us a local mechanism that produces different correlations that do not violate Bell's inequality seems quite irrelevant in this context.
3. Despite the tone of the paper suggesting a certain naturalness or inevitability to the concepts it explores, we should keep in mind that it was the author himself who has chosen to redefine the "common cause principle" for the needs and purposes of AQFT (or rather, who has chosen to follow Rédei 1997 while admitting noncommuting operators). Hence, when confronted with the objection that the very concept he defined is unsubstantial because it lacks a certain crucial property, he can hardly defend himself by pointing out that the concept lacks this property by definition.
As far as I was able to understand from this and other publications (e.g. Rédei 1997 , Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés 2013a , 2013b , the whole reasoning behind the concept of a "common cause in AQFT", on which the author's work is crucially based, is that the common cause principle formulated by Hans Reichenbach is somehow "classical" and that there is a canonical way to translate or generalize it to the framework of algebraic quantum field theory. However, leaving aside whether Reichenbach's common cause principle is at all the relevant concept in this context (since his discussion had a different focus), to characterize it as "classical" strikes me as a rather confused and confusing statement. The common cause principle is a meta-physical concept, formulated in terms of (what some people call) "classical probability theory". However, the word "classical" in "classical probability theory" shouldn't be confused with the same adjective in the term "classical (i.e. Newtonian) mechanics". It doesn't refer to a particular physical theory that can be empirically tested and falsified, but to a wellfounded mathematical framework expressing a certain way of reasoning about nature. It is possible, of course, to borrow Reichenbach's definition and replace the probabilistic events, assumed to be modeled on a classical probability space, by projections in in the published version (Hofer-Szabó and Vecsernyés 2013a, p. 414), possibly as a result of our exchange on the matter. I leave here the quote from the preprint, which was available to me by the time my commentary was written, and which I still believe to reflect a fundamental misconception on part of Hofer-Szabó and collaborators.
local algebras and the (classical) probability measure by a "quantum state", yielding a value between 0 and 1 when evaluated on such projections; but there's no reason to believe that this procedure must yield a meaningful notion of "common causes" or "common cause explanations" in the context of any theory. Of course, there are people who believe that quantum theory is and has always been about replacing "classical probability spaces" by so-called "quantum probability spaces". Nevertheless, I would think that, for the sake of a meaningful and enlightening philosophical discussion, we will have to do better. In any case, I would insist that, if we work under this general hypothesis, the fact that certain results we obtain may strike us as counterintuitive or even logically inconsistent need not necessarily reflect some sort of quantum weirdness in nature; it may just as well reflect a lack of imagination or understanding on our side to appreciate that quantum physics is not always about putting little hats on capital A's and B's and C's to turn them into operators. 6
In my opinion, much of the confusion in the paper stems from its commitment to a particular jargon that insists on using familiar and intuitive terms ("events", "common causes", etc.) with a non-standard meaning (usually referring to operators). Thus, I find it very helpful to drop this jargon altogether and discuss the situation in the framework of good old-fashioned quantum mechanics to see what the result obtained by Hofer-Szabó actually consists in. Let's consider the usual spin-singlet state
giving rise to EPR-correlations between the results of spin-measurements on two entangled particles, which can be performed simultaneously by Alice and Bob. In the sense promoted in the paper, a "noncommuting joint common causal explanation" would, for instance, consist in the following: after the particles leave the EPR-source, we perform a z-spin measurement on particle 1, taking place in the common past of the measurements of Alice and Bob, who are free to choose between certain orientations other than the z-direction. This (chronologically) first measurement now provides a (non-trivial) "noncommuting joint common cause system" in the sense of Hofer-Szabó, namely C = |↑ ↑| ⊗ 1, C ⊥ = |↓ ↓| ⊗ 1 .
Obviously, the probabilities for the outcomes of the succeeding measurements will now split (which, the author insist, is the defining property of a "common cause"). Just as obviously, the first measurement would simply destroy (decohere) the singlet-state so that the outcomes of the spin-measurements by Alice and Bob will no longer be correlated in a way that violates the Bell-or CHSH-inequality. The result presented in the paper Noncommutative causality in algebraic quantum field theory, although more general and technically more sophisticated, doesn't do anything more than this. I leave it to the reader to judge its explanatory value.
